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Abstract: The price-wedge method yields a tariff-equivalent estimate of technical barriers to trade 
(TBT). An extension of this method accounts for imperfect substitution between domestic and 
imported goods and incorporates recent findings on trade costs. We explore the sensitivity of this 
revamped tariff equivalent estimate to its determinants (substitution elasticity, preference for home 
good, trade cost, and to the reference data chosen). We use the approach to investigate the ongoing 
U.S.-Japan apple trade dispute and find that removing the Japanese TBT would yield limited 
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1. Introduction 
           Article 20 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permits governments to 
set their own standards and regulations on trade in order to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health, provided they do not discriminate among countries or use this motive as concealed 
protectionism. In addition, two specific World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements deal with 
food safety and animal and plant health, and with product standards: the  Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPSA) and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement 
(TBTA). The SPSA allows countries to set their own standards, but it requires that the standards 
should not arbitrarily discriminate between countries with similar conditions. The TBTA is 
generated to minimize unnecessary obstacles in regulations, standards, and testing and 
certification procedures. In practice, however, some governments use stricter health and safety 
regulations than necessary to isolate domestic producers from international competition. The 
stricter regulations may lead to questionable impediments to imports that compete with domestic 
products, in addition to the existing tariff barriers. When the possibility of a disease or pest 
transmission is very low or threat to food safety is small, these trade impediments often cause 
welfare losses for importing countries and mercantilist losses for exporting countries due to 
reduced exports. 
 These issues have of course attracted the attention of economists (Anderson, McRae, and 
Wilson; Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina; Josling, Roberts, and Orden; and Roberts and Krissoff). 
The growing literature on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and other TBTs often uses 
a price wedge approach to quantify the impact of a barrier on market equilibrium and trade (see 
for example, Calvin and Krissoff; and Campbell and Gossette). Although not unique or 
sophisticated, the method has been legitimized in the economics literature with some prescriptions   3 
and qualifiers to account for transportation cost and quality differences (Baldwin; and Deardorff 
and Stern). The use of a price wedge approach often abstracts from quality differences or simply 
addresses the difference by choosing “close” substitutes. Transportation costs may be reduced to 
the CIF-FOB differential and abstract from the internal transportation cost once imports are landed. 
All price-wedge estimates we are aware of rely on the assumption of homogeneous commodities 
and a price arbitrage condition.  By assuming that domestic and imported goods are perfect 
substitutes, the gap between their prices reflects trade impediments from various policies and 
natural protection. Border tariffs and transportation and transaction costs prevent full arbitrage 
between the two prices (Head and Mayer). Hence, in principle, the price gap can yield an estimate 
of the TBT once transportation and trade costs and other impediments have been taken into 
account. 
 In this paper we derive a revamped tariff equivalent of a TBT. We extend the price-wedge 
framework by first relaxing the homogeneous commodity assumption, a straightforward but 
instrumental step overlooked in the literature on TBT measurement. We account explicitly for 
commodity heterogeneity and perceived quality of substitutes. Next, we incorporate recent 
developments and findings on large and costly border effects arising from transportation, linguistic 
differences, and poor infrastructure and law enforcement (Anderson and van Wincoop; and Head 
and Mayer; and Hummels and Skiba). Two major findings of this new literature are particularly 
relevant to our work. First, trading costs are very large and often greater than policy impediments 
and cannot be ignored. While CIF/FOB ratios have fallen over time, other transportation and trade 
costs have remained high and have been underestimated. Second, these costs are structured on a 
per-unit basis rather than following the so-called iceberg method; that is, they act as a specific 
tariff rather than an ad valorem tax (Hummels and Skiba). These per-unit costs shift supply in a   4 
parallel manner rather than proportionally, which influences the estimate of the TBT.  
 We systematically explore the robustness of the tariff-equivalent estimate to underlying 
assumptions, i.e., commodity heterogeneity, consumer preference for the home good, trading and 
transportation costs, and the chosen reference data. Using a simple approach, we derive the 
sensitivity of the tariff equivalent to varying assumptions on these determinants and its 
implications for welfare analysis.  
 Our paper bridges two methods often used to estimate the trade effects of TBTs: the tariff-
equivalent–price-wedge approach mentioned previously and use of a gravity equation. Recent 
conceptual developments have provided theoretical foundations to the gravity equation approach 
and account explicitly for relative prices of traded and domestic substitutes and for trading costs. 
In addition, they attempt to better measure and decompose “border effects” of trade barriers and 
transportation costs between trade partners. These new approaches have been applied to aggregate 
trade data but not to individual commodities (Anderson and van Wincoop; Head and Mayer).  
 In an often-cited paper, Calvin and Krissoff provide a tariff equivalent of phytosanitary 
barriers in the Japanese apple market regarding the risk of contamination by fire blight and 
coddling moths that has been the origin of a long WTO dispute between the US and Japan (WTO 
2002-2004). The dispute has attracted much attention and has not yet been resolved (as of winter 
2005). Calvin and Krissoff use the law of one price under a homogeneous commodity assumption 
(arbitrage condition) to calculate the tariff equivalent of SPS barriers affecting apple imports in 
Japan to avoid damages from fire blight and coddling moths. By assuming that Japan’s domestic 
apples and imported apples are perfect substitutes, the gap between the prices of domestic and 
imported apples accounts for the border tariff and other trade impediments that prevent full 
arbitrage. The latter authors also abstract from other border effects (internal transportation and   5 
transaction costs), leading to a likely overstatement of the TBT barrier. They use several reference 
years to mitigate annual variations in the reference data used to calibrate the tariff equivalent to the 
TBTs. Using recent data and the proposed revamped approach, we provide a new investigation of 
the Japan-US apple dispute. We compute the tariff equivalent of associated Japanese TBT 
regulations and quantify the impact of removing these policies on welfare and apple trade flows. 
We also draw policy implications. The apple dispute offers an opportunity to validate our 
contention that departures from perfect substitution, significant trade costs, and reference data 
have a substantial impact on the tariff equivalent estimate of SPS/TBT regulation and hence on 
welfare and policy implications derived from this estimate. 
2. Analytical Framework 
              As in the gravity equation, we use the simple constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
model to incorporate the heterogeneity of goods in consumers’ preferences and eventually to 
calculate the tariff equivalent of a TBT (Hummels and Skiba). Define domestic and imported 
goods, D and I. We assume the case of a small country facing a parametric exogenous world price 
of imports. The price PD of the domestic good is determined by the domestic good market 
equilibrium, as explained later in the paper. The representative consumer maximizes utility U 
subject to a budget constraint:  
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where M is expenditure;  r a,  are parameters reflecting preferences; and pD and pI are retail prices 
of the two goods D and I. Home-good preference implies α > ½. The associated Marshallian 
demand functions are 
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 being the elasticity of substitution.  
The corresponding indirect utility function is  
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and adding the corresponding expenditure function, we have 
s s s s s a a - - - - + = 1
1
1 1 ) ) 1 ( ( ) , , ( I D I D p p u u p p e .   (5) 
The importing price pI includes the import unit cost (CIF price inclusive of the international 
component of trade cost), the tariff, the tariff equivalent of the SPS or TBT barriers, and the 
internal transportation cost. All these components translate into a definition of the price 
R TBT CIF I t t t p p + + + = ) 1 ( , where  CIF p  is the observed CIF (unit cost plus insurance and freight 
and other international trade costs) price of I, t is the tariff rate,  TBT t  is the tariff equivalent of the 
TBT or SPS measure, and  R t is the per-unit transportation and transaction cost from the harbor to 
the wholesale internal market. The CIF price can itself be decomposed into an export price from 
the originating country and an international transportation cost component. 
From utility maximization, we know that the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the 
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where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution, and MUj indicates the marginal utility of good j. 
From (8), the ad valorem tariff equivalent  TBT t  is solved after deriving the MRS from (1) and   7 
substituting it back into (6). The equivalence between the price-wedge measure  TBT t and the TBT 
holds D/I constant. The ad valorem tariff equivalent is a function of the relative cost of the two 
goods, their volumes, the elasticity of substitution, the preference parameter, internal transaction 























a      (7) 
Here we treat internal transaction and transportation cost as specific instead of ad valorem, which 
mitigates the variability of  TBT t  to different CIF price values across different reference years. For 
example, assuming σ=10, when transportation and transaction cost is treated as specific,  TBT t  is 
170%, 86%, and 131% for years 1998, 1999, and 2000 respectively; but when the cost is treated as 
ad valorem,  TBT t  is 186%, 72%, and 137% for the corresponding three years. 
 To measure the sensitivity of the  TBT t  to assumptions on unobservables, we hold 
“observed” variables D, I, PD, PCIF, and tR constant and obtain the following sensitivity elasticities 
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Reference data used to calibrate (7) also matter greatly. To measure the sensitivity of  TBT t  
to the chosen reference data, we derive similar elasticities with respect to quantity volumes D and 





























































































































































ln  < 0.     (15) 
Elasticity εσ is large in absolute value for small values of σ and converges to zero as σ increases. 
Elasticity εα, in absolute value, is the largest of the sensitivity measures; it decreases as goods D 
and I become closer substitutes but remains larger than 1. This fact has implications for gravity 
equation analyses, which often impose α =0.5. This restriction may strongly bias the estimates of 
impediments to trade. The measures εD and εI are equal and opposite in sign and also depend on 
the value of  σ. The values decrease in absolute value as D and  I become closer substitutes. 
Sensitivity measures εPD and εPCIF are equal in absolute value and larger than one but smaller than 
εα by a factor of (1-α). They decrease as goods are closer substitutes but remain larger or equal to 1   9 
in absolute value. The sensitivity measures εtR and εt will be small (large) in absolute value if the 
transportation costs, tR, and the tariff, t, were to be small (large) and if the estimate of the TBT, 
tTBT, were to be large (small).  
Hence, we can identify a taxonomy of the cases. If goods D and I are known to be poor 
substitutes (presumption of small σ), the TBT estimate will be very sensitive to the value of σ and 
parameter α and to chosen reference prices and quantities. However, if goods D and I are known to 
be very close substitutes (with presumption of high σ), the tariff estimate of the TBT will be much 
less sensitive to pinning down the exact elasticity of substitution, and to reference data volumes D 
and I. Sensitivity to chosen reference prices and preference parameter α will still be important and 
larger than 1 in absolute value. Sensitivity to changes in internal transportation or transactions 
costs and the tariff rate will depend on their initial values and could be large for protected and 
poorly integrated sectors.  
 For the welfare analysis, we use the usual Equivalent Variation (EV) and Compensating 
Variation (CV) measures of the consumer’s welfare, with  0 1 0 ) , ( m u p e EV - =
r
 and 
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 and subscripts 0 and 1 indicate initial and new prices. 
We use a small displacement model to determine the price of domestic apples and 
eventually infer the impact of removing the TBT barrier on imports and domestic market 
equilibrium. Let S be the retail supply of domestic apples, which is an increasing function of 
domestic apple price and exogenous parameter λ:  
=
S ε
DD S(p, λ) λp ,       (16) 
where εS represents the own-price elasticity of the domestic apple supply. Decreases in parameter 
λ would reflect upward shifts in supply if contamination occurs and induces an increase in the cost 
of production. Using equations (2) and (16) the equilibrium domestic price 
e
D p  and quantity are   10 
determined by market equilibrium condition, or 
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ee
DID D(p,p)S(p, λ).     (17) 
Equations 2, 3, 7, and 16, and condition 17 constitute the model. With the elimination of 
TBT t ,  I p  decreases and  pD will fall as a result if there is no risk of contamination from the 
increased imports. The demand for domestic products declines with the change in pI. Then the 
domestic market adjusts at a lower price such that demand equals supply. Imports expand as the 
direct effect of the decrease in the import price is larger than the feedback effect of the lower 
domestic price, by stability. If contamination occurs, the price of domestic apples may not 
decrease as the domestic supply shifts upward to reflect the increased cost from contamination. 
The domestic apple equilibrium quantity is further reduced by the contamination. Imports increase. 
For simplicity, we assume away feedback effects from apple suppliers into the income of the 
representative consumer. We turn next to our investigation of the Japan-U.S. apple dispute starting 
with some key stylized facts on the dispute. 
3. The Japan-U.S. Apple Dispute 
 The high technical barriers to importing apples into Japan have brought repeated 
complaints from several exporting countries and have led to a 30-year dispute (Elms). The latest 
episode of this dispute has been taking place within the WTO.  Japan-Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Apples (WTO 2002-2004) relates to the United States’ complaint about the 
Japanese requirements imposed on apples imported from the United States and their inconsistency 
with WTO principles. The prohibitions and requirements included, for example, the prohibition of 
imported apples from states other than designated areas in Oregon and Washington; the 
prohibition of imported apples from any orchard (whether it is free of fire blight or not) if fire 
blight was detected within a 500-meter buffer zone surrounding such orchard; the requirement that   11 
export orchards be inspected three times a year (at blossom, fruitlet, and harvest stages) to check if 
fire blight is present in order to apply the afore-mentioned prohibitions; the requirement that at the 
post-harvest stage apples for export to Japan be separated from fruits for export to other markets; 
and chlorination of apples for export to Japan.  
In 1997, the United States requested that Japan modify its import restrictions on apples 
based on published scientific evidence that mature, symptomless apples are not carriers of fire 
blight. In 2000, the United States agreed to carry out joint research proposed by Japan to confirm 
the results of those earlier studies. The USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Japan's 
Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) conducted the joint research. The research 
results confirmed that mature, symptomless apples are not carriers of fire blight. This finding 
provided additional scientific support for the U.S. position. Since the results of this research were 
released in February 2001, the U.S. government has repeatedly pressured Japan to modify its 
import restrictions. After extensive bilateral discussions with USDA scientists, Japan refused to 
modify its import restrictions in October 2001. 
In March 2002, the United States requested WTO consultations concerning Japan’s import 
restrictions on U.S. apples. Consultations in April 2002 failed to settle the dispute. In May 2002, 
the United States requested that the WTO establish a panel to consider the Japanese restrictions. In 
June 2002, a panel was established by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO to consider 
this issue. Before the Panel, the United States claimed that Japan was acting inconsistently with 
some articles of the SPSA, certain articles of the Agreement on Agriculture, and the so-called 
"GATT 1994." In July 2003, the Panel found that Japan's phytosanitary measures were maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence and inconsistent with Japan's obligation, did not qualify as a 
provisional measure, and were not based on a risk assessment. In September 2003, Japan appealed   12 
the WTO Panel ruling. In addition to Japan's appeal, the United States cross-appealed the Panel 
Report. At the same time, third participants, such as Australia, Brazil, the European Communities, 
and New Zealand, filed their submissions. After more investigations, in November 2003, the DSB 
upheld the findings of July 2003. Therefore, the Appellate Body recommended that the DSB 
request that Japan bring its inconsistent measures into conformity with SPSA.  
Half a year later, in July 2004, the United States held that Japan failed to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB by the end of the reasonable period of time. Therefore, 
the United States requested that the DSB establish a panel and simultaneously requested 
authorization on suspension of concessions and other obligations in one or more of the following: 
tariff concessions and related obligations under the GATT 1994 on a list of products; and 
concessions and other obligations under the SPS Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture. 
Because Japan objected to the United States’ suspension request, this matter has been referred to 
arbitration. Because of the need to consult scientific experts, the Panel expects to finish its final 
report by May 2005, nearly nine years after the initial U.S. complaint. 
Between 1971 and 1992, Japan imported only 4,500 boxes of apples, all from South Korea 
and North Korea. In June of 1993, Japan permitted some import of New Zealand apples. After that, 
the United States and Australia also exported apples to Japan from year to year. Although Japan 
opened its door to foreign apples, the importing quantity has been quite low compared with the 
domestic production. As shown in Table 1, the import shares never exceeded 0.1% between 1998 
and 2000. The low import share is partly due to the high tariff and TBT barrier. Table 1 shows that 
the border price is much lower than the domestic wholesale price.  
 
   13 
Table 1. Japanese Apple Production and Imports 
 Source of data: Japan Customs. Note: MT denotes metric tons. 
 
In addition to the high technical barrier referred to in the dispute, the higher quality of the 
domestic product cannot be neglected. Fruits in general and apples in particular are an important 
part of the Japanese diet (Huang). Japanese consumers exhibit a strong home-good preference 
relative to imported apples. This fact has been repeatedly established (Kajakawa; USDA; and 
American University). According to Japanese consumers, domestic apples have a higher quality 
because of their sweeter flavor and bigger size. For instance, after Japan opened its apple market 
to imports in 1995, U.S. apples entered Japan at much lower prices than Japanese domestic 
products. However, after an initial success, the sales of U.S. apples declined because Japanese 
consumers complained that U.S. apples were too sour and did not cater to Japanese tastes 
(American University). Japanese consumers prefer apples with brix (a measure of sugar level) in a 
certain range and a specific brix-to-acid ratio. But imported apples do not meet these requirements. 
In addition, imports are smaller in size and less juicy (Kajikawa). For Japanese consumers who 
believe that apples must have an appropriate brix and acid level, firmness, juice, size, and flavor, 
imported apples cannot be a perfect substitute for domestic products.  
Japanese farmers produce apples with great care and the production of apples is labor 
intensive. Leaves near each apple are usually plucked away when the fruit is still on the tree, 
which ensures that the apple receives enough and balanced sunlight to insure full ripening. Several 
weeks before harvesting, bags are used to protect individual apples in order to prevent any kind of 














1998  879100  753000  217  221  136  0.03% 
1999  927700  668200  264  308  233  0.05% 
2000  799600  691600  238  594  156  0.09%   14 
surface marring. This labor-intensive production leads to a higher quality and at the same time 
comes at a higher cost. Because of the quality difference and trade barriers, Japanese producers are 
able to pass the higher costs to consumers in the form of a higher price. Hence, the trade barriers 
do not explain the entire price wedge. A price differential reflecting the quality premium would 
remain under free trade. In addition, as a fresh fruit, the internal transportation cost for apples is 
high and cannot be ignored. 
4. Quantifying the Apple Dispute 
 We apply the framework developed in section 2 to imported apples in Japan. We use all 
imported apples to estimate I and the average import unit cost measured as the CIF price, shown in 
Table 1, and to compute the tariff equivalent of the Japanese TBT regulations.
2 Then we estimate 
the impact of eliminating the TBT. The transportation and transaction cost, tR, is approximately 96 
yen/kg. The latter is obtained from Anderson and van Wincoop, who provide a median estimate 
for transportation and transaction costs of 55 percent (percentage of CIF unit value), which 
includes domestic distribution from harbor to wholesale market, border barriers, language, and 
currency barriers. We apply this estimate to each year and average over the corresponding three 
years 1998-2000 to obtain the 96 yen/kg as a per-unit cost. The tariff rate is listed in Table 2; the 
average rate of the three years is 17.6%. As in Calvin and Krissoff, the long-run supply elasticity 
of domestic apples is assumed to be 1. We follow the estimate of the Australian Department of 
Primary Industries and Fisheries and assume that with the transmission of pest and disease the 
production of apples would decrease by a fixed proportion of 20% with the TBT in place.  
 To test the sensitivity of the value of  tTBT to the elasticity of substitution, we assign 
                                                    
2.Alternatively, we treat imports from different countries as imperfect substitutes using a double-nested CES model 
and calculate the tariff level of TBTs. Results are quite similar to what we present in this paper. For example, when 
we assume the elasticity of substitution among imports as 10, and s =10, the TBT is 145%, which is quite close to 
the 130.54% TBT level obtained by aggregating all imports into one good.   15 
different values to s , with 5 unit increments. Estimates for s = 5, 10, and 15 are shown in Table 
2. To test the sensitivity of the value of tTBT to a  and to tR, the transportation and transaction rate, 
different values are assigned to them (for example, see Tables 4 and 5). The default value for a  is 
0.5 as assumed in many gravity equation analyses. 
4.1. TBT Tariff Equivalent Estimate and its Sensitivity Analysis 
 The last three columns of Table 2 show the tariff equivalent of the TBT when s  is 
assigned to different values.  
Table 2. TBT Tariff Equivalent with Different Values of s  








1998  18.20%  621.58%  170.46%  85.14% 
1999  17.60%  368.74%  85.81%  30.52% 
2000  17.00%  447.76%  130.54%  65.70% 
 Note: Transportation plus transactions costs equal 96.19 yen/kg. a =0.5. 
 Source: WTO schedules and Japan Customs.  
 
The tTBT value is relatively low in 1999 compared with the other two years. This is because the 
border price of that year is much higher than the other two years. The reason is that in 1999, the 
world price of oil doubled relative to 1998 because of strong world oil demand, an OPEC oil 
production decline, and low oil stock levels. The higher oil price made the international 
transportation cost much higher than for other years, which in turn led to a higher border price and 
domestic wholesale price (this phenomenon also occurred for other fruits such as summer oranges, 
Japanese pears, and peaches). We can see that tTBT changes noticeably with different values of s . 
The higher the value of  s , the lower the tariff equivalent  tTBT. The intuition behind this is 
straightforward. The higher the elasticity of substitution, the smaller the required change in price 
PI in order to have consumers switching to domestic apples.  
 Table 3 gives the elasticity of tTBT with respect to s  (holding  R t , a  constant). Measures of   16 
s e  show that tTBT is sensitive to s , especially when the value of s  is low (imperfect substitutes). 
For example, when s =5,  s e  is less than -1.4, a value which indicates tTBT would differ a lot even 
if the change in s  was to be small. Tripling s  reduces the tariff-equivalent estimate by one order 
of magnitude. Thus, s  plays an important role in the calculation of tTBT. When s  gets larger, the 
sensitivity gets smaller in absolute value. When s =50 (approximating perfect substitution), the 
sensitivity is not as high as before, but it is still significant. 
Table 3. Elasticity of tTBT with Respect to s (a =0.5;  R t  = 96 yen/kg) 
s   5  10  15  20  25  30  50 
s e 1998  -1.627  -0.813  -0.54  -0.407  -0.325  -0.271  -0.163 
s e 1999  -1.536  -0.768  -0.51  -0.384  -0.307  -0.256  -0.154 
s e 2000  -1.412  -0.706  -0.47  -0.353  -0.282  -0.235  -0.141 
 
Table 4 gives the elasticity of  TBT t  with respect to a  (holding s ,  R t  constant);  TBT t  is highly 
sensitive to a  around α=0.5 but this high sensitivity decreases somewhat as α increases. Good 
information on α appears to be critical in estimating the tariff equivalent of the TBT. 
Table 4. Elasticity of  TBT t  with Respect to a  (s =10;  R t  = 96 yen/kg) 
a   0.50  0.52  0.54  0.56  0.58  0.60  0.62 
a e 1998  -4.22  -3.45  -2.86  -2.39  -2.02  -1.71  -1.46 
a e 1999  -5.71  -4.43  -3.53  -2.87  -2.36  -1.96  -1.64 
a e 2000  -4.74  -3.80  -3.11  -2.57  -2.15  -1.81  -1.53 
 
Table 5 gives the elasticity of tTBT with respect to  R t  (holding s , a constant) and shows that tTBT 
is sensitive to  R t  when the latter gets large but goes to zero as  R t  decreases. Around the central 
value (96 yen/kg) used in our computation, the elasticity of tTBT to  R t  is approximately -0.5 and 
hence plays an important role in the calculation of the tTBT. 
 
   17 
Table 5. Elasticity of  TBT t  with Respect to  R t  (yen/kg) with s =10, and a =0.5 
R t   17.5  35  52.5  70  87.5  105  122.5 
R t e 1998  -0.056  -0.119  -0.190  -0.271  -0.363  -0.469  -0.594 
R t e 1999  -0.063  -0.134  -0.220  -0.310  -0.420  -0.550  -0.706 
R t e 2000  -0.062  -0.132  -0.210  -0.304  -0.412  -0.539  -0.690 
 
 Additional analyses of the elasticity of  TBT t  with respect to the domestic and imported 
quantities show the tariff equivalent  TBT t  is less sensitive to the domestic and imported quantities 
than it is to their prices (Appendix Tables A1 and A2). The moderate elasticities remain nearly 
constant as quantity levels change. In contrast, the elasticity of  TBT t  with respect to the domestic 
price is always greater than one and gets larger as the domestic price increases (Table A3), and the 
elasticity of  TBT t  with respect to the CIF price is less than –1 and gets smaller as the CIF price 
increases (Table A4). The elasticity of  TBT t  with respect to t (holding s  and a  constant) indicates 
that the sensitivity of  TBT t  goes up as the value of the tariff rate increases, although all of the 
estimated values are less than -0.5 (in absolute value) for t, ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 (Table A5). 
4.2 Welfare Analysis of the TBT Removal 
 The import increases are shown in Table 6 for different values of s . By eliminating the 
TBT (alone and with border tariff elimination), apple imports would increase substantially, 
between 33 and 145 10
3 MT, depending on the base year and the assumed elasticity of substitution. 
These magnitudes are in a range of values comparable to those of Calvin and Krissoff. These 
larger imports remain moderate relative to domestic apple consumption. Japan imports apples 
from Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States. The U.S. share of apple imports 
by Japan has varied widely over time. In 2000, the value share of U.S. apples into total apple 
imports was 24%; in 1999, it was 54%; and in 1998, it was 0%. Based on the 2000 share, and 
s =5, the expansion of U.S. imports by Japan would only amount to US$48 million, and even less,   18 
about US$13 million, if one assumes s =15.
3 The losses to U.S. exporters and producers would be 
smaller than the value of imports, first because they would valued at lower FOB prices and 
farmgate prices, respectively, and because producer surplus losses are always smaller than the 
gross value of forgone production opportunities. The US$ 48 million figure is about a third of the 
lost exports claimed by the United States at the WTO (US$143.4 million). 
Table 6. Increase in Imports (10
3 MT) with the Elimination of  TBT t  and Tariff (a =0.5) 
Elimination of  TBT t   Elimination of  TBT t +Tariff 
Years 
s =5  s =10  s =15  s =5  s =10  s =15 
1998  144.5  69.8  32.6  196.9  124.3  81.8 
1999  66.6  13.4  0.67  102.2  33  4.32 
2000  139.5  70.5  37.7  187.4  122.9  89.3 
 
 Figure 1 shows the demand and supply of domestic apples in year 2000. Curve D (solid 
line) is the initial demand for domestic apples in 2000. D1 is the demand after the elimination of 
the TBT and D2 is the demand after the elimination of both TBT and the tariff. S is the supply 
curve of domestic production without the transmission of disease and pests. St is the supply of 
domestic apples with the transmission of disease and pests. We can see that the demand for 
domestic apples shifts inward with the elimination of either TBT or the tariff. And the supply of 
domestic apples shifts to the left (decreases) with the transmission of disease and pests.  
 Changes in welfare with elimination of TBT and the tariff under different assumptions on 
the transmission of disease indicate the relative magnitude of impacts. Table 7 shows the welfare 
implications of eliminating the TBT and the tariff for 2000, when assuminga =0.5, transportation 
plus transaction costs of 96 yen/kg, and under the condition of no disease transmission. The table 
shows that the EV (and CV) and the producer’s surplus change dramatically with the change of s . 
However, when there is no disease transmission, CV net of tariff revenue loss is greater than the 
                                                    
3 The incremental US$ 48 million of U.S. imports come from the 2000 U.S. value share of all apple imports by Japan, 
or 22249000/92630000=24%, applied to the expansion in import value (139.5 10
3 MT *155.91 yen/kg), expressed in 
US$ with an exchange rate of 107.765 yen/$.   19 
loss of the producer’s surplus for both elimination of tTBT and elimination of tTBT and the tariff no 
matter what value s  takes. Table 8 shows the welfare implications with disease transmission 
holding other conditions the same as in the previous analysis. When s =5, the net welfare is 
positive. But when the value of s  is equal to 10 and above, EV plus the tariff revenue do not 
exceed the loss of the producer’s surplus when there is disease transmission. So the elimination of 
the TBT may not improve welfare. The results apply to the case when both the TBT and the tariff 
are eliminated.  
Figure 1. The Demand and Supply Curve of Domestic Apples in 2000 (s =5, a =0.5) 
 
The results are sensitive to the transportation and transaction cost assumption, as shown in 
Tables 9 and 10. When the transportation and transaction costs,  R t , are decreased by 64 percent 
(from 96 yen/kg to 35 yen/kg), the elimination of the TBT leads to an EV net of tariff revenue loss 
always greater than the loss of the producer’s surplus when values of s  are less than 30, hence 
guaranteeing social welfare gains. This is the case either with or without the transmission of 
disease. When both the TBT and the tariff are eliminated there are social welfare gains for all   20 
values of s . From the welfare analysis (Tables 7-10) we see that the welfare implications differ 
greatly with different values of transportation and transaction costs and a different value σ. 
Table 7. Welfare Analysis with Elimination of  TBT t  (and Tariff)  
( R t  = 96 yen/kg, a =0.5, Without Disease Transmission) 
*Net Welfare=(EV + Change of Tariff Revenue-Loss of Producer Surplus)  Note: Welfare is measured in million yen 
(2000 prices).  
Table 8. Welfare
* Analysis with Elimination of  TBT t  (and Tariff)  
( R t  = 96 yen/kg, a =0.5, With Disease Transmission) 
*Net Welfare=(EV + Change of Tariff Revenue-Loss of Producer Surplus) 
 
Table 9. Welfare Analysis with Elimination of  TBT t  (and Tariff)  
( R t =35yen/kg, a =0.5, Without Disease Transmission) 















5  7345  66890  47574  30145  44089  87881 57309  35848  52017 
10  6123  40975  32813  25137  21961  62114 45107  33599  28499 
15  5500  33042  27522  22583  15960  54718 41075  32528  22174 
20  5114  29039  24687  20999  13154  51151 39032  31895  19240 
25  4849  26585  22891  19911  11523  49039 37790  31477  17546 
30  4654  24914  21641  19112  10456  47640 36954  31180  16444 
*Net Welfare=(EV + Change of Tariff Revenue-Loss of Producer Surplus) 



















5  3700  36784  30070  19496  20987  47441  36834  23670  23755 
10  1869  13302  12308  9879  5292  22379  19703  15543  6820 
15  1001  6343  6108  5318  2026  14443  13279  11308  3119 
20  530  3176  3116  2846  861  10347  9736  8640  1691 
25  269  1564  1549  1472  360  7801  7448  6787  998 
30  127  731  728  728  130  6053  5838  5422  615 

















5  4603  26258  22648  24014  6847  37765  30722  28380  9369 
10  2822  3731  3648.4  16105  -9552  14660  13462  22565  -7921 
15  1853  -3411  -3483  11971  -13529  7480.3  7155  19558  -12093 
20  1260  -7107  -7428  9355  -15202  3812  3726  17669  -13873 
25  875  -9417  -9988  7527  -16068  1540  1526  16356  -14832 
30  617  -11013 -11801  6169  -16565  -21  -22  15384  -15421 
Net Welfare   21 
Table 10. Welfare Analysis with Elimination of  TBT t  (and Tariff)  
( R t  = 35yen/kg (a =0.5, With Disease Transmission) 















5  7345  58335  43080  34892  30788  80169  53926  40430  39723 
10  6793  35240  29030  32273  9760  57543  42647  40205  17322 
15  6787  28548  24331  31011  4324  51403  39178  40104  11283 
20  6778  25300  21932  30262  1816  48539  37492  40047  8476 
25  6767  23370  20466  29764  372  46881  36495  40010  6855 
30  6757  22086  19475  29408  -565  45799  35837  39984  5799 
*Net Welfare=(EV + Change of Tariff Revenue-Loss of Producer Surplus) 
 Tables 11 and 12 give the welfare implications of eliminating the TBT and the tariff 
assuming home good preference increases to a =0.55. Results differ from those obtained when an 
equal preference (a =0.5) is assumed. All welfare measures decrease substantially. For example, 
under the assumption of no disease transmission, consumer gains (EV) from an elimination of the 
TBT for s =5 drop from 36,784 under the assumption of  a =0.5 (Table 7) to 27,191 when 
a =0.55 (Table 11). When a  varies, the net welfare changes accordingly. The effect of a  on the 
change to consumers’ and producers’ welfare suggests the need for decisionmakers to account for 
differences in a  in deciding whether the TBT is worth eliminating or not. Gauging a  properly is 
important in providing dependable estimates of the effect of the TBT. 
Table 11. Welfare
 Analysis with Elimination of  TBT t  (and Tariff) 
( R t  = 96 yen/kg, a =0.55, Without Disease Transmission) 
*Net Welfare=(EV + Change of Tariff Revenue-Loss of Producer Surplus)Note: ** TBT is negative which is of no 
economic meaning. 















5  1587  27191  23339  10616  8767  36545  29910  13817  22712 
10  267.1  5887  5684  2281  768  12129  11297  4747  7366 
15  37.65  1548  1533  409  40  5482  5306  1542  3924 
20  -------  ------
**  -------  -------  -------  2823  2775  450  2356 
25  -------  ------
  -------  -------  -------  1590  1575  113  1461 
30  -------  ------  -------  -------  -------  949  944  15  918   22 
 
Table 12. Welfare
 Analysis with Elimination of  TBT t  (and Tariff)  
 ( R t  =96 yen/kg (a =0.55, With Disease Transmission) 
*Net Welfare=(EV + Change of Tariff Revenue-Loss of Producer Surplus) 
 
Figures 2 and 3 summarize the sensitivity of estimates of welfare and import effects to 
removing the TBT for varying assumptions on the level of s  and  R t  change when there is no 
disease transmission. The welfare measures include EV, producer surplus, and net welfare 
(EV+Tariff Revenue -Loss of producer’s surplus). The transparent plate is the zero plate, provided 
for reference. Figures 2-1 and 2-2 show the decrease in estimates of EV and producer surplus loss 
when either s  or  R t increases, and that EV decreases faster when s is smaller and  R t  is bigger. 
Figure 2-3 shows change in the net welfare: net welfare is large when s  or  R t  is small and 
eventually approaches zero when either s  or  R t  takes on a larger value. Figure 4 shows that 
imports decrease as s  or  R t  increases.  
 
 















5  2066  17796  16061  14065  5796  24152  21064  17780  6356 
10  437  2782  2736  4975  -1756  6016  5804  9154  -3154 
15  88  411  410  1622  -1122  1731  1713  5000  -3285 
20  9  3  3  405  -392  446  445  2705  -2275 
25  ------  ------
  -------  -------  -------  70  70  1393  -1339 
30  ------  ------  -------  -------  -------  ------  -------  -------  -------   23 
Figure 2. Welfare’s Sensitivity to s  and  R t  with Elimination of TBT 
(Without Disease Transmission, a =0.5) 
 
Figure 2-1 EV’s Sensitivity to s  and  R t  
 
Figure 2-2 Producer Surplus Loss Sensitivity to s  and  R t    24 
 
Figure 2-3 Sensitivity of net welfare (EV+Tariff Revenue-Loss of PS) to s  and  R t  
 
Figure 3. Increase in Imports’ Sensitivity to s  and  R t   
with Elimination of the TBT (10
3 MT) 
 
   25 
5. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we revamped the tariff equivalent of a TBT by relaxing the homogeneous 
commodity assumption, accounting for perceived quality of substitutes and incorporating recent 
findings on trade costs. The latter are often larger than policy impediments and cannot be 
abstracted from them. Transportation and trade costs are structured on a per-unit basis rather than 
following the so-called iceberg method. Specific (as opposed to proportional) trade costs reduce 
the variability of the tariff equivalent estimate of the TBT with respect to the variability of import 
unit value across different reference years. Their influence on the TBT estimate is mitigated as the 
import unit value increases. Trade costs and imperfect substitution have offsetting influences in 
the computation of the tariff estimate of the TBT. Since most previous applications have 
abstracted from both of them, they have somewhat mitigated the error implied by these two 
simplifications and dissimulated the inherent sensitivity of the TBT estimate to each of these 
underlying parameters.  
We explored the sensitivity of the tariff equivalent of the TBT with respect to a series of 
parameters. The tariff equivalent and hence welfare analysis based on the tariff equivalent 
measures are sensitive to several key parameters, such as the elasticity of substitution, consumers’ 
home preference, and, to a lesser extent, transportation and transaction cost. The sensitivity to the 
consumers’ home preference has some implications for gravity equation models that impose 
restrictions of equal preference for imported and domestic goods. These models are likely to 
provide biased measures of trade impediments and should relax this assumption.  
We then provided a rigorous investigation of the Japan-U.S. apple dispute. The 
investigation first validates the approach and indicates the importance of empirical estimates of the 
magnitude of preferences and trade costs (α, σ, and tR). More importantly, it raises interesting   26 
policy implications. A striking result in the analysis of the apple dispute is that the increase in 
apple imports would be small (in value) no matter what parameter estimates are used. It appears 
that the alleged damage in lost exports claimed by the United States at the WTO (US$143.4 
million) is substantially overstated. The political economy of the case is also intriguing. Much 
political goodwill has been spent on this dispute relative to the small size of the potential direct 
gains in agricultural exports. Ancillary benefits may exist if the United States eventually succeeds 
in opening the Japanese market and establishes a reputation as a persistent negotiator. Other 
countries or protected industries may pay attention to the United States’ resolve in opening 
markets and may refrain from engaging in costly disputes.     27 
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Elasticity of tTBT with respect to domestic quantity D (1000 MT) ( 5 . 0 , 10 = = a s ) 
D   600  620  640  660  680  700  720  740  760  780 
D e 1998  0.216  0.215  0.215  0.214  0.213  0.212  0.212  0.211  0.211  0.210 
D e 1999  0.291  0.289  0.288  0.286  0.284  0.283  0.281  0.280  0.279  0.277 
D e 2000  0.242  0.241  0.239  0.238  0.237  0.236  0.236  0.235  0.234  0.233 
 
  Table A2. Elasticity of  TBT t  with respect to imported quantity I (MT)( 5 . 0 , 10 = = a s ) 
I   200  240  280  320  360  400  440  480  520 
I e 1998  -0.208  -0.213  -0.217  -0.220  -0.223  -0.226  -0.229  -0.231  -0.234 
I e 1999  -0.265  -0.273  -0.280  -0.287  -0.294  -0.300  -0.306  -0.311  -0.317 
I e 2000  -0.208  -0.212  -0.216  -0.219  -0.222  -0.225  -0.228  -0.230  -0.233 
 
Table A3. Elasticity of  TBT t  with respect to domestic price pD ( 5 . 0 , 10 = = a s ) 
D p   210  215  220  225  230  235  240  245  250  255  260  265 
D p e 1998  2.19  2.13  2.08  2.03  1.98  1.94  1.91  1.87  1.84  1.81  1.78  1.76 
D p e 1999  5.45  4.94  4.53  4.2  3.93  3.7  3.5  3.33  3.18  3.05  2.94  2.83 
D p e 2000  2.9  2.78  2.67  2.57  2.49  2.41  2.34  2.28  2.22  2.17  2.12  2.08 
 
 
Table A4. Elasticity of  TBT t  with respect to CIF price ( 5 . 0 , 10 = = a s ) 
CIF p   130  140  150  160  170  180  190  200  210  220  230  240 
CIF p e 1998  -1.64  -1.73  -1.82  -1.93  -2.04  -2.18  -2.33  -2.51  -2.71  -2.95  -3.24  -3.59 
CIF p e 1999  -1.48  -1.53  -1.59  -1.66  -1.73  -1.81  -1.9  -1.99  -2.09  -2.21  -2.34  -2.48 
CIF p e 2000  -1.65  -1.74  -1.83  -1.94  -2.06  -2.2  -2.36  -2.54  -2.75  -3  -3.3  -3.67 
 
 
Table A5. Elasticity of  TBT t  with respect to t (s =10, a =0.5) 
t  0.1  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.18  0.2  0.22  0.24  0.26  0.28  0.3 
t e 1998  -0.059  -0.0704  -0.08  -0.094  -0.106  -0.117  -0.129  -0.141  -0.153  -0.164  -0.176 
t e 1999  -0.117  -0.1398  -0.16  -0.186  -0.21  -0.233  -0.256  -0.28  -0.303  -0.326  -0.35 
t e 2000  -0.077  -0.0919  -0.11  -0.123  -0.138  -0.153  -0.169  -0.184  -0.199  -0.214  -0.23   28 
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